The Partition of India

The seed of communalism was sowed by the British rulers by igniting the desire in the minds of the Muslims to establish a separate country by dividing India on the basis of religious sentiment. What was the role of the then national leaders of India including M. K. Gandhi and others? The following selected excerpts from Shrii P. R. Sarkar’s writings will give an answer. Could India avoid this sad partition? According to him, yes, India could avoid this disgraceful partition if the leaders of the national congress of that time could divert the sentiment of entire freedom fighters from the demand of a mere political freedom to achieve the economic freedom. They did not do it as for them the control of the political power of India was more important than the all round progress of vast Indian population.
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“During the struggle for independence, a great blunder was committed by Mahatma Gandhi. In order to show his innocence, he said that he would not support the communal award, but nor would he vote against it. That is, indirectly he supported it. What happened to the country after this was due to the Himalayan blunder committed by Mahatma Gandhi. At that time he should have said, "No. I do not support the communal award." He did not say this because his party workers and party leaders were eager to become ministers, so they pressed him for provincial autonomy. But Mahatma Gandhi neither supported it nor opposed it. He committed a great blunder.

What has happened in the country after this is the result of what Mahatma Gandhi did. At that time he should have said that we can neither split the country nor disintegrate it. As a result of the communal award, the country was trifurcated into Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. This was the result of the blunder of Mahatma Gandhi, and he did it under the pressure of his party leaders. They wanted to become ministers, as there was scope in the government of India at that time for wresting provincial autonomy, attaining ministership, creating two new provinces -- Orissa and Sind -- and separating Ceylon and Burma from India.

Provincial autonomy was promulgated in the year 1935, but it was implemented in 1937. Sind agreed to provincial autonomy because in Sind a particular party, a minority party of India, was in the majority. Orissa was created out of physical convenience rather than mental necessity. It was very difficult for the people of Orissa to go to the capital town Patna, as they had to go to Patna through Calcutta. This is why they demanded that either Orissa should be included in Bengal, or there should be a separate province. Their demand was that Orissa should not remain in Bihar, because in order to go to Patna the people had to travel through Calcutta. The creation of Orissa was not bad, but the creation of Sind was bad. These were the poisonous effects of the enactment of provincial autonomy by the Government of India in 1935.

As an example of the communal approach of the Government of India, take the case of Bengal. At that time reservation in the Bengal assembly was for 250 seats. 250 seats were created as part of provincial autonomy. Of these 250 seats, 120 were for Muslims, 80 were for non-Muslims, 25 were for British merchants -- for the British businessmen of Calcutta to contest elections -- a few were for Zaminders, a few were for universities, and a few were for labour leaders. The total: 250. In Bengal at that time, 45% of the population was Muslim and 55% was non-Muslim. That is, the land of Bengal was not only physically divided but also mentally divided, as a result of which Bengal was divided on the basis of communal consciousness, which is unnatural. Communalism is unnat ural. Again today, the foolish leaders, the political leaders, are encouraging this very sentiment. And I fear that if it is not controlled in the proper time -- it is the most opportune moment to control it -- if it is not controlled in the proper time, the country will face further disintegration.

Factually, as per the Government of India plan at that time, India was trifurcated. Bengal was bifurcated. The Punjab was bifurcated. Assam was bifurcated. Sind and North West Frontier Province went out of India. This was the result of the communal award. The foolish leaders, the stupid leaders, supported the communal award. They had not learnt the lessons of history.

The policy was divide and rule. One party said "Jai Hind" and another party said "Takasi'me Hind." One party said "Victory to India;" another party said "Divide India." These were the slogans of the time. It was not a healthy atmosphere. This sentiment was not even geo-sentiment. It was based on emotion and mean selfishness. Henceforward, healthy politics disappeared from India. Nehru supported partition because his dream was to become Prime Minister of the land -- of either undivided India or divided India.

Montague Chelmsford saw that the forces were divided and was not sure whom to give power to. In 1935, provincial autonomy was granted. Ceylon and Burma, which were parts of India, are now inimical to India. During partition -- during Montague Chelmsford's time or during 1935 -- the Government of India granted autonomy. A senior Muslim leader of India pronounced Montague Chelmsford as "Montague Chilamford" because he could not pronounce "Chelmsford." At that time there was no mutual faith, there was want of mutual understanding. That is why the country was divided. Otherwise, the British could not have divided the country. There was both physical disintegration and psychic -- psycho-social -- disinte gration for want of proper education.

Most of the minorities could not rely on the Hindu majority of the country. That is why -- out of fear complex -- they wanted to divide the country. The Hindu minorities of Bengal and the Punjab could not rely on the Muslim majority. That is why they wanted the partition of those two provinces. The same psychology is prevalent today. At that time there was not even a wee bit of political education or political consciousness in the country.

As per provincial autonomy, the Chief Minister of the provinces were known as the Prime Minister. There was no Prime Minister of India. India was loosely controlled by India House, London.

The Native States were beyond the 1935 award. This is the reason why the communal position of the Native States was better than that of the rest of India. There was hardly any communalism in Kashmir where Muslims lived under the Hindu Raj. Similarly, the Hindu majority state of Hyderabad was under a Muslim leader, and there was hardly any communalism. The reason was that the Native States were free from the communal award. The British communal award was not applied there.

Serpents are exhaling venom everywhere..... It is the right moment. It is the proper moment. It is the most opportune moment.

Na'giniira ca'ridike fushiteche bishakta nishvas
Shantir lalit vani shonaibe bartha parihas
Bida'y nebar bela' tai d'a'k diye jai
Danaver sathe ja'ra' samgra'mer tare prastut hateche ghare ghare.

"Serpents are exhaling venom everywhere.
The sweet gospels of peace sound like empty mockery.
That is why on the eve of my departure from this world,
I send out a clarion call to those who are preparing in every house to fight against the demons in human form."

Serpents are exhaling venom everywhere. Now at this critical juncture, should we go on preaching the gospels of peace? No, no, no, no! So, before my departure from the world, said Rabindranath, I have made the necessary preparations for the fight against these demons. Do you all follow? What Rabindranath said 60 years ago is also true in this last portion of the twentieth century.” (Shrii P. R. Sarkar, ‘THE DANGERS OF COMMUNALISM’, Prout in a Nutshell Part 18)

Need of reuniting Bengali (Bangalistan)

"Certain portions of the original land of Bengal are now in Assam. In 1912 during the period of Lord Curzon, because of the folly of national leaders, Bengal was partitioned. After the movement against the partition of Bengal, Bengal was reunited in 1912, but certain portions in Assam and Orissa remained outside the jurisdiction of Bengal. The leaders at that time accepted this plan so there was no objection to this division. This situation should not be allowed to continue. All the portions of Bengal should be reunited. What is essential for Bengal is to develop a sense of unity. Bengal will be debalkinised when this unity is developed.

The people of Bengal are more black in the west and southwest, and more yellow in the north and northeast. The people of Bengal have almost the same blood relationship.

The area of Bangalistan consists of the following regions -- West Bengal, Tripura, the Bengali speaking areas of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and parts of Nepal, and Bangladesh. How will you unite the fragments and fractures of Bengal? Throughout this area there is socio-economic disparity. In Bangladesh the people suffer from suffocation and natural calamaties because there are no develoment schemes. For example, in many places there is only one crop a year and the rest of the time the land is vacant. There should be development schemes in Bangladesh to raise the standard of living of the Bangladesh people. The economic standard of India should also be raised but Bangladesh should be raised more rapidly. Only when there is economic parity amongst Tripura, Bengal and Bangladesh, should India and Bangladesh become united.

Should the people of Bangladesh and Tripura be rehabilitated in West Bengal? No, not at this stage, as this will hamper the development of the people of West Bengal. The best approach is to work for the economic upliftment of the people of Tripura and Bangladesh to ensure their long-term socio-economic progress. There should be a constructive socio-economic movement in Bangladesh. This should include technical education, agricultural development and movements which guide the people away from dogma. All religions encourage centres of dogma. Education should not preach dogma. Education should be free from all the influences of dogma. Next to Indonesia, Bangladesh's population is saturated and about to burst. As there is disparity in Tripura and Bangladesh, we should think more for the development of Tripura and Bangladesh. Other than the Bengali speaking districts of Dhubri, Goalpara and Barpeta, the economic development of Assam is somewhat satisfactory."

The Partition of India

"When the British decided to quit India under economic and political pressure, undivided India was the demand of the Hindu leaders, while the Muslim leaders demanded a Muslim homeland. There was no scope for an amicable settlement between these two demands. Therefore the British had to divide India. It mattered little whether India liked it or not.

Under such circumstances, was there any way for the leaders to avoid the partition of India? Yes, there was. Had they started a movement for economic independence instead of accepting the partition of India, it would have been possible to form a united and independent India. But neither the Hindu nor the Muslim leaders did so, for reasons best known to them. The economic struggle could not have remained confined to British exploitation only, but would have extended to the Indian exploiters (social, economic, psychological). When the British would have realized that their exploitation was not going to continue, they would have been compelled to grant political indep- endence to India, and with political independence exploitation by the local people would have come to an end also. But the Hindu and Muslim leaders came from the bourgeois class and so they did not like this idea. They wanted liberty keeping capitalism (social, economic, psychological, etc.) alive. For this reason they accepted the political independence of divided India.

There are two more reasons why they did not want economic independence. One of these reasons was that those who were leaders in the struggle for political independence might not prove to be suitable leaders in the struggle for economic independence. Especially, the struggle for economic independence might lead to mass revolution and bloodshed at any time. And there was every possibility of young leaders appearing among the revolutionaries. The leaders did not want this. They tried to check the sanguinary revolution by preaching the theory of non-violence.

The leaders had one more weakness in this matter. Most of the leaders, both Hindu and Muslim, had grown old in the course of the political struggle. Possibly they thought that if they started a fresh fight for economic independence, and if the fight lasted a long time, the chance of controlling the government would not come to them. Perhaps with this idea in mind they gave their consent to a heinous crime such as the partition of India.

Where did the mistake lie? The factors which made Europe a country of many nations are applicable to India also. Rather, the differences which exist in India between one provincial nation and another are greater than those existing in Europe. The provincial nations have their own languages, manners, customs, mode of living, race, intonation, history and traditions. Some of them have their own scripts, almanac, dress and code of law of inheritance. The differences among the European nations are not as great. Still, in the struggle for independence, the English language and the anti-British sentiment had made India one nation. With the departure of the British there is no anti- British sentiment, and so the Indian nation has died.

Today there are only a few persons who regard themselves as Indians; some look upon themselves as Punjabis, some as Andhrites, some as Bengalis, some as Bhumihars, some as Rajputs, etc. None of them are Indians. The only connecting link which exists today is the weak tie of the English language. Those who are guided by a false sense of patriotism are trying even to do away with this language today.

It is crystal clear that with the banishment of the English language, the funeral ceremony of an Indian nation will be complete.

With the departure of the British from India that is, with the death of the anti-British sentiment a new sentiment should have been created, but the Indian leaders failed to do so. The Pakistani leaders did so to some extent. In the beginning they utilized anti-Hindu sentiment in place of anti-British sentiment, and later anti-Indian sentiment was created on the question of the Kashmir issue. These sentiments helped the people of Pakistan to some extent, but in India there is no sentiment at all. Like Pakistan, India had ample opportunity to utilize several sentiments, but the leaders did not use them. They roamed in the realm of imagination." (Shrii P. R. Sarkar, in “To the Patriots”)
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Some related articles

Pakistan and Indian Muslims

By Kuldip Nayar

IN his introduction to a book on partition, leading historian Dr V.N. Datta has recalled how "the fundamental question was of the status of Muslims in India." Undoubtedly, that was in the mind of Qaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah when he realised that the British rule would not last long. The two-nation theory and the demand for Pakistan were the necessary corollary.

The partition is 57 years old this week. What the rulers of Pakistan and the breakaway Bangladesh have to ask themselves is how far their policies have contributed to the betterment of the "status" of Muslims in India. The main sacrifice was theirs and they suffered the most.

Any land when divided on the basis of religion has to face the fallout like estrangement between communities. The creators of Pakistan would have known this because it was they who initiated the appeal in the name of religion. But what did they do to attend to the "status" of Muslims in India is the question.

It was in the scheme of partition that the number of minorities in both countries would be large. Some excesses against them were expected. But none anticipated the ethnic cleansing which took place in both Punjabs. Nor did anyone expect that the administration in both the countries would be mixed up in the killing and looting. For Indian Muslims, the nightmare is not over.

Jinnah probably realised what they would go through. He tried to retrieve the situation by announcing after the demand for Pakistan was conceded that the people on both sides were Pakistanis or Indians, not Muslims and Hindus in the eye of the state. Politics would not be mixed with religion. He even promised more. But the so-called custodians of Pakistan did not allow his words to be broadcast over the radio lest what they had in mind should get jeopardized. They wanted to play the role of an adversary to India and create further cleavage between Muslims and Hindus to justify the creation of Pakistan.

Jinnah had overestimated the power of his words. Fanatics did not want to give up religion as the basis of nationhood. In that they found their entity and the basis for propaganda. To them, progressive Islam was an anathema. The founder of Pakistan was thus reduced to an instrument, just a means to an end, not the end itself. In any case, the hatred in the name of religion had seeped so deep that both Hindus and Muslims in many parts of India and Pakistan jumped at one another's throat as soon as the British left. More than one million were killed and 20 million were uprooted from their hearths and homes. Muslims living in India, although assured of a secular polity, went through innumerable sufferings. They would have been still worse off but for the intervention of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the top Congress leaders. They tried to keep Hindu communal elements at bay. Gandhi even sacrificed his life while doing so.

The Pakistan rulers should not have at least sabotaged the efforts to establish a secular polity in India. It guaranteed the future of Muslims. Pakistan had, in fact, an obligation that the beleaguered Indian Muslims would not be harassed by its action. But what did the policies of their rulers sum up? Treating India as an enemy and trying to disintegrate it has made little sense. Whatever the Pakistan rulers did to hurt India affected nearly 120 million Muslims living in the country. They were doubly punished, both by the policies of Pakistan and the distrust of most Hindus.

Once I told a Pakistani ruler that the more intractable attitude Islamabad adopted, the most pernicious effect was on the Indian Muslims. He shrugged his shoulders and said; "This was the price the Indian Muslims would have to pay for the integrity of Pakistan." It is a strange argument but the Pakistan rulers still believe that in the heart of heart the Indian Muslims supported Pakistan.

Muslims in India, on the other hand, are stepping out into light after decades of darkness. Gujarat halted the process but the manner in which the secular elements, the media and the judiciary tore the state machinery and its politics into pieces has encouraged them. The fact that even after losing power at the Centre, the BJP has not gone back to Hindutva indicates that communal parties also have developed vested interest in the joint electorate.

With the Congress in power and the left watching it, there is every possibility that the status of Muslims in India would improve. The community may begin to play as important a role in the polity as, for example, the Sikhs do. Again, much will depend on Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The atmosphere of goodwill that has come to prevail in the region has helped Muslims assert their entity in India. One, the contemptuous remark that they are "Pakistanis" has more or less gone. Two, there is a growing realisation in India that it can make economic gains only as a homogenous society, without division on communal basis.

India's vision of economic union with Pakistan and Bangladesh as its members can come true only when there is an equal participation of people - Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians in the region. Recent signals from Islamabad are, however, not encouraging. The Indian delegation and the media parties have returned with the impression that the Pakistan government is beginning to drag its feet on improving relations with India. A timeframe for composite dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad has been suggested.

Kashmir is brought in directly or indirectly at every forum. No doubt, President General Pervez Musharraf has said that he would wait for a "reasonable time" to see some "concrete outcome on Kashmir" to emerge. But he continues to hold the gun. The problem, which has eluded solution for the last 50 years, cannot have a timetable. It would very much depend on how soon people on both sides build trust in one another and how soon the Kashmiris accept a status short of independence.

Strangely, Islamabad has not yet demolished the terrorists' training centres. Even America said the other day that the network of terrorists is more or less intact in Pakistan. Terrorists in Kashmir have still their supply line and the guidance structure in Pakistan. Even the resolution on terrorism passed at the SAARC foreign ministers' conference was at the behest of Washington. Musharraf had no choice.

In Bangaldesh, where there are many more Hindus than in Pakistan, fundamentalism is increasing day by day. It is taking the shape of terrorism which is as much terrifying the Bangladeshi Muslims as the Hindus. Being a weak government, Dhaka can neither handle its own terrorists nor the ones who have made it a place for their operation against India.

Dhaka has reportedly promised to turn a new leaf in its relations with New Delhi. The Khaleda Zia government is reaching out to Hindus as well. If Islamabad also continues to push the confidence building measures, a new era of understanding may usher in the region.

This will, ultimately, help the minorities. Economic ties know no differences. Nor can bias stay when there is an easy access of people to one another's country. Both things when implemented may provide answer to the question that bothered Jinnah; the future of Muslims in India.

Copyright 2004, The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd., 75, M.G. Road, Post Box No 5331, Bangalore – 560001, Tel: +91 (80) 25880000 Fax No. +91 (80) 25880523 (Source of the article: Deccan Herald)
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Pakistan-SA Relations: A Link to the East Worth Forging

Business Day (Johannesburg, OPINION: August 10, 2004, Posted to the web August 10, 2004)

By Greg Mills - Johannesburg

SET on a hillside on the road from Islamabad airport is the inscription, Unity, Faith, Discipline. These words point to Pakistan's problems since independence in 1947.

Pakistan's name highlights its internal vulnerability. Meaning "pure land", it is said that the term was coined from Punjab (P), Afghans (A), Kashmir (K) and Sindh (S), with "stan" denoting land. Its diversity was evident in the breakaway of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971, and continuing rivalry with India over the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region.

Yet the search for unity belies Pakistan's long, varied history, and unique and rich traditions, often overlooked in the contemporary definition of national identity along religious grounds, the strand that ties much of this ethnically diverse land.

This thread was manipulated by successive military governments in their search for legitimacy, notably in the overt Islamisation of Gen Zia ul-Haq's junta between 1977 and 1988. This had regional dimensions given the close relationship, first, between Islamabad and the mujahideen fighting the Soviets in neighbouring Afghanistan and, subsequently, with the Taliban.

The split from British India occurred in 1947 mainly because of differences of faith, and related issues over representation of Muslims. As Mohammed Ali Jinnah, founder of modern Pakistan, said in 1940: "Muslims and Hindus belong to two different religious philosophies: they neither intermarry nor interdine (and) to yoke the two together, one as a numerical minority, and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent."

Paradoxically, faith today remains a critical reason for close western engagement with Pakistan and a principal problem for President Gen Pervez Musharraf's government to manage in the context of Islamic fundamentalism.

This difficult path of nation-building without religion demands much higher levels of economic development for Pakistan's 150-million people as Musharraf walks a fine line between his US allies and the mullahs.

SA's ties with Pakistan have been shaped by five related factors. First, by Pretoria's close and symbiotic relationship with India. This may change as Pakistan and India edge closer together.

Second, by the nature of Musharraf's ascendancy to power after his military coup in October 1999, and his subsequent attempts to civilianise, constitutionalise and thus legitimate his rule.

Third, by Pakistan's role in the war on terrorism, finding itself at the centre of the attention of US regional efforts, especially in Afghanistan, and of Islamic militants wishing to foment regional instability. This has been highlighted by the recent arrest in Gujrat of South African citizens implicated in terrorist activity.

Related to this, there are shared bilateral concerns about counterterrorism, money laundering and drug smuggling along with illegal people flows (mainly via Mozambique). These have focused Pretoria's attention especially with Pakistan's (now-lifted) suspension from the Commonwealth, which had diminished ministerial contact and trade prospects.

Fourth, Pretoria's stance on nuclear nonproliferation does not square with Islamabad's (and Delhi's) declared nuclear weapons status. This has led Pakistani officials to query SA's motives, and the importance, in their terms, for SA not to "be seen as a stalking horse for the west" .

Finally, there is a small but growing economic link, supported by Musharraf's significant economic reforms and the increasing attractiveness of Pakistan's populous market. Bilateral trade ties have grown fivefold to R1,1bn since 1994, almost two-to-one in SA's favour. Trade is likely to increase with Pakistan's macroeconomic reforms since 2000.

Almost overlooked in the war on terrorism is a 5,4% growth in Pakistan's economy in 2002-03, climbing to 6,4% in 2003-04. Inflation is still under control at just 4%. Pakistan's economy has exhibited high growth rates since its first fiveyear plan (1955-60) was instituted after independence. From a nonexistent agricultural base and little infrastructure, the economy grew 3,1% in the 1950s and 6,8% in the 1960s, but dropped to 4,4% in the 1970s with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's nationalisation programme, which shattered private sector confidence. As a result, industrial growth fell from 10% in the 1960s to 3,1% the following decade.

Economic growth perked up with Zia's military government to about 6,5%. This and the current boom suggests to some local analysts entrepreneurs want stability, continuity and consistency in policies provided by military governments. Yet this understates wide-ranging structural reforms by Musharraf's government, including tax, tariff, capital market and agricultural reforms, privatisation and deregulation.

A country previously always risking default on its high external debt of 33bn, as the economy has expanded, debt has fallen from 52% of gross domestic product in 2000 to 37% today.

Pakistan has revised growth prospects upwards to 6,6% in 2004-05, 7,5% the following year, and 8% in 2006-07. Economists view increased private sector credit as vital in this process, reflecting more confidence as well as the effect of banking and financial services reforms.

Borrowings have doubled in the past year to $5bn, bolstered by an additional 1bn in foreign direct investment.

The country needs to continue the fight against terrorism and build its image. Pakistanis admit while some negative images are of their own making, officials contend there is hypocrisy in how the war on terrorism is being waged, reducing its ability to fight extremists.

They complain that when a bomb goes off in Madrid or New York there is a multilateral response; but when a bomb goes off in Pakistan, there is a travel advisory not to go there. This breaks the global partnership, which is exactly what the terrorists want.

Critics argue that Pakistan is an archetypal failed state with insoluble religious tensions and deficits, outrageous electoral malfeasance and endemic poverty and corruption.

Yet it sits at an extraordinarily important juncture in geopolitical and economic terms. The prospect of its economy firing in tandem with that of India and China is enticing, but will have wider implications in linking Japan, East Asia, China, and India with the Middle East a bridge in a contemporary silk road linking east with west, opening up economies and political systems alike.

Not many would disagree Pakistan has a central role in the war on terrorism, as recent warnings from Pakistan about al-Qaeda's US intentions illustrate.

Moreover, its failure to deal with domestic insecurity could spark a wider conflagration. However, there are other sound, economic reasons why Pakistan's progress demands closer inspection.

Mills, national director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, has been researching in Pakistan. (Source of this article: All Africa Websie)
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The Changing Indian Muslim
Vir Sanghvi, July 31, 2004

It is a measure of how far removed the internal politics of the Muslim community is from the secular mainstream that we have heard so little about a debate over the limits to fundamentalism that is currently raging within the community. On one side are ranged a variety of Muslim intellectuals and activists — many under the banner of Muslims For Secular Democracy — and on the other is a section of the fundamentalist establishment, along with such mass circulation newspapers as Bombay’s Urdu Times.

For nearly as long as I can remember, anybody making the case for secular harmony always comes up against the standard Hindu taunt: if you are so keen on fighting Hindu fundamentalism, then why don’t you do something about Muslim fundamentalism and fanaticism? Why is it okay to ban The Satanic Verses just because some mullahs object? Why is it okay to overturn the Shah Bano judgement only because fundamentalists within the Muslim community wish to retain the right to mistreat their wives? Why is it okay to ask the Shahi Imam to issue a fatwa in favour of a political party but anti-secular when sadhus and sants campaign for Uma Bharti? Why must Hindus be criticised for being concerned with their places of worship while the tax-payer is simultaneously paying for Muslims to go to their place of worship in the form of the Haj subsidy? Why do secularists get so agitated about the curriculum at RSS schools when madrasas are spreading fundamentalist venom?

These are good questions. And I’ve always believed that one reason why the BJP has so much middle class Hindu support is because secularists have never been able to provide convincing answers. Instead, we have confused secularism with bending over backwards to appeal to the lowest common denominator within the Muslims and appeasing fundamentalist community leaders.

When the Babri Masjid was demolished, many educated liberal Muslims of my acquaintance were shattered. They believed then that they had allowed fundamentalists to hijack their community’s leadership and recognised that most Hindus now thought that Muslim politics consisted exclusively of the right to kill Salman Rushdie and to refuse to pay maintenance to discarded wives.

The community was probably too shattered to come up with any long-term solutions during that period. But the trauma of the Gujarat riots seems to have had a salutary effect. Not only are educated Muslims asking the right questions again but many are actually running a campaign to reform the community from within.

Many of those involved with Muslims For Secular Democracy are those who were the most critical of Narendra Modi and the most active in trying to find some judicial redressal once the political system had been hijacked by the bearded mass murderer. But this time around, they said to themselves: it is not enough to attack Hindu fundamentalism; it is time we took on the fundamentalists in our own community.

The list of people involved with Muslims For Secular Democracy reads like a who’s who of liberal Muslim intellectuals but the organisation’s best-known spokesman is probably the poet and lyricist Javed Akhtar, who is one of the founding members.

Javed and his friends decided that mere liberal opposition to the community’s fundamentalists would be counterproductive. The liberals would merely be dismissed as atheists or communists. Instead, Muslims For Secular Democracy chose a different path. They called meetings of Muslims from all over India and agonised over a draft declaration on the issues confronting the community.

In many areas, they took surprisingly liberal stands. They believed that elements of Muslim Personal Law as it exists in India were regressive and anti-women. For instance, even though the Koran specifies that a daughter will inherit one-third of her father’s property, this does not apply to agricultural property under Indian Muslim Personal Law. Similarly, the triple talaq provision is far more liberal in India than in most developed Muslim countries where women are offered much more protection. Even the right to have four wives is subject to all kinds of qualifications in Bangladesh and Pakistan, while it is seen as pretty much a basic right of all Muslim men by the Indian Muslim Personal Law Board.

The declaration was even more daring when it came to so-called controversial issues. For instance, Muslims For Secular Democracy declared that Muslims in India did not need the Haj subsidy and argued that it was doing more harm than good to the Muslim community.

Once the draft declaration was ready, teams from the core group of Muslims For Secular Democracy traveled all over India, held meetings at centres of Muslim learning and debated the provisions. There were the predictable objections from the fundamentalists but the general mood of the community was surprisingly liberal.

For instance, says Javed Akhtar, nobody had explained to Muslims that the Haj subsidy is effectively a subsidy to Air-India, not to Muslims. Air-India takes the money from the government and then sells tickets at what it claims are discounted fares. But, says Javed, given the volume of business during the Haj period, most airlines are willing to sell tickets at special fares that are even lower than Air-India’s. When this was explained to Muslims all over India, they recognised that the subsidy, which they had been told was a mark of India’s secularism, was actually meaningless. All it did was provide another stick for Hindu communalists to beat the Muslim community with.

Why were Muslim audiences so receptive? All of us have been told that the Muslim community is now so insecure that any attempts at reform will be resisted and treated as an assault on the community’s basic freedoms.

On the contrary, says Javed, his feeling is that Muslims are tired of being taken for granted by their leaders and treated as polling booth fodder by political parties. Yes, they’re insecure, he concedes. Anybody would be after Gujarat. But the insecurity has led to greater introspection, not to a sullen resistance to reform.

Predictably, the more conservative elements in the community are bitterly opposed to Muslims For Secular Democracy. Such bodies as the Muslim Personal Law Board have such entrenched interests (assisted somewhat by the fact that few Muslims understand how the board’s members are elected) that they will resist all attempts to reform the law.

But there has also been a more virulent streak to the opposition. For the last several weeks, Urdu Times, a paper published from Bombay, has been viciously attacking Javed personally and questioning the credentials of Muslim For Secular Democracy.

Local Muslim politicians have met the police commissioner of Bombay to complain about the reformers: their claim is that if Muslims For Secular Democracy go too far then conservative Muslims may take to the streets and there could be a law and order problem. (This is a familiar tactic. The same argument was used to justify the ban on The Satanic Verses.)

The politicians and the fundamentalist leaders believe that their position is strong because Maharashtra will go to the polls in a few months. The state government is being told that unless it acts firmly (i.e. against the reformers) the Congress-NCP alliance will lose the Muslim vote.

It is claimed that at one meeting of the reformers somebody said that all books, including the Koran, consisted of propaganda of one kind or another. This, say the fundamentalists, is blasphemous and represents an insult to Islam. Therefore, many of the reformers should immediately be arrested.

The worst vitriol is reserved for Javed himself. He has been personally attacked on the grounds that he is a) a divorcee, b) a communist, c) an atheist, d) an American agent, e) a Jew agent, and God alone knows what else. That these allegations are self-contradictory tells us something about the level of the opposition.

I have no idea how the debate will shape up. But Javed says he is optimistic. He believes that the hysterical response from the fundamentalists shows that they are worried. He thinks that the days of the Muslim vote bank are over. Already, he says, the Muslim community has moved much further than most Hindus recognise: there are no more demands to ban books, no attempts to make Muslim Personal Law more regressive (as in the Shah Bano case), and people like the Shahi Imam now count for nothing at all.

Sadly, there is very little that non-Muslims can do to help the debate along. All change must come from within the community and it must come from a basic recognition that it is time to move into the 21st Century.

Nevertheless, it is hard not to agree with Javed Akhtar when he tells the fundamentalists that for people like them, secularism only means the freedom to practice their own kind of fundamentalism. If they believe that the liberals have no rights within their community, then how are they any better than Praveen Togadia who believes that Muslims have no right in India? (Source of this article: Hindustan Times)